<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Systems-Thinking on Rabid Curiosity</title><link>https://blog.thomas-bray.com/tags/systems-thinking/</link><description>Recent content in Systems-Thinking on Rabid Curiosity</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><copyright>Thomas Bray</copyright><lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2026 09:30:00 -0500</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://blog.thomas-bray.com/tags/systems-thinking/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Reflections on Trusting Trust</title><link>https://blog.thomas-bray.com/posts/reflections-on-trusting-trust/</link><pubDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2026 09:30:00 -0500</pubDate><guid>https://blog.thomas-bray.com/posts/reflections-on-trusting-trust/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="introduction"&gt;Introduction&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ken Thompson&amp;rsquo;s 1984 Turing Award lecture, &amp;ldquo;Reflections on Trusting Trust,&amp;rdquo; makes a deceptively simple argument: you cannot fully trust code you did not write yourself, because the compiler that built it might have been compromised. The implications reach far beyond computer security. Trust in complex systems is always, at some level, an act of faith—and understanding that shapes how you should build, operate, and rely on things you can&amp;rsquo;t fully verify.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>